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ABSTRACT
In a crisis, almost-instant choices about who to trust or distrust
could make a difference between life and death. Trust is neces-
sary for cooperation, coordination, social order, and to reduce the
need for coercive state imposition. During a pandemic, people
need to trust experts to help them understand and respond to
the problem, governments to coordinate policy instruments and
make choices about levels of coercion, and citizens as they
cooperate to minimize infection. We compare these general
requirements with specific developments in the UK and US, iden-
tifying: the variable reliance by elected politicians on scientific
experts, worrying levels of distrust in elected leaders, and a shift
from a trust-based to more impositional forms of government
action (with more variation in responses in the US). While trust is
difficult to define and measure, these examples show that people
miss it when it is gone.
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Trust describes a belief in the reliability of other people, organizations, or processes. It
is necessary for cooperation, which helps people coordinate action without the need for
imposition. It helps reduce uncertainty in a complex world. It facilitates social order
and cohesiveness. Therefore, it has a strong impact on policy design, ownership, and
commitment to the results. However, trust is not unconditionally good, since it can
prompt uncritical support (Devine et al. 2020) or cooperation with some at the expense
of others (Putnam 2000, 21–22). Distrust (or mistrust) in others can be a potent motiv-
ator, prompting people to ignore evidence and advice or defy government instruction
(Citrin and Stoker 2018).
We explore this dynamic in relation to COVID-19. First, we explain the meaning of
trust by synthesizing key insights from our systematic narrative review of the social sci-
ence literature (see Cairney and Wellstead 2019). Second, we focus on early UK and
US experiences of COVID-19, drawing on our documentary analysis of minutes and
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meeting papers from UK science advisory bodies (see Cairney 2020a, 2020b) and sec-
ondary sources on the measurement of trust in the US and UK.
We illustrate the pivotal role of three elements: policymaker trust in experts to help
them understand the policy problem, policymaker trust in citizens to follow govern-
ment advice or instruction, and public trust in government and government policy.
These examples highlight the potential for a lack of trust to contribute to poor policy
design or outcomes: policymaker distrust in scientific advice, when not taking the issue
sufficiently seriously or not including science advice in policy design, government dis-
trust in the public, prompting a shift from exhortation toward a level of social impos-
ition rarely seen outside of wartime, and public distrust of government, when not
agreeing to voluntary action or defying obligations to maintain a safe distance from
each other.
Comparing these elements helps explain the international reputation of the UK and
US for delayed and insufficient responses. It may also encourage lesson-learning from:
more successful COVID-19 responses in countries such as New Zealand, South Korea,
and Singapore (Mazey and Richardson 2020; Kim et al. 2020; Woo 2020); or, previous
public health crises in relation to public trust in government policy on issues such as
Ebola and BSE (Blair, Morse, and Tsai 2017; Sell et al. 2016; Forbes 2004) or policy-
maker trust in experts during H1N1 vaccination (Baekkeskov 2016). However, while
there is much for the UK and US to learn, most comparative studies do not define trust
well enough to show how it fits into the story (Powell and King-Hill 2020). We address
this problem by clarifying the dynamics of trust and distrust in theory and practice.
2. The meaning of trust in relation to policy and policymaking
Table 1 summarizes the ways in which social science literatures describe trust in rela-
tion to reliability, interdependence, psychology, and action. Reliability may relate to the
Table 1. Categories and themes in research on trust.
Theme Subtheme
Trust as reliability Interpersonal trust
Trust as necessary to society Interdependence
Trust as the independent or dependent variable Trust as crucial to a positive outcome
Trust as a resource to be developed
The psychology of trust through the lens of the
“truster” (cognition, emotion, behavior, and “evolution”)
Action based on the calculation of risk: assessing others
Action based on the calculation of risk: self-management
Willingness to take risks while vulnerable to the actions
of others
Using cognition/emotion to address uncertainty and
vulnerability
Social psychology in relation to “social capital”
Tribalism
Properties or behaviors of the “trustee” (the people or




A degree of selflessness
Mutual self-interest
Providing benefits (or no costs)
Stated commitment to an obligation
Shared identity or values
Source: adapted from Cairney and Wellstead (2019)
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perceived qualities of an actor, such as their integrity (if someone says they will do
something, I believe they are being honest), credibility (I believe they are making feas-
ible claims in relation to their ability) and/or competence (I believe they have the ability
to do something). This perception facilitates behavior essential to policymaking, in
which actors rely on others to address uncertainty, by seeking credible information
about a problem or the feasibility of a solution, and ambiguity, by seeking an authorita-
tive account of how to understand a problem or how best to solve it. We describe three
key ways to describe trust development in that context.
2.1. Individual psychology
People rely on cognitive “biases” or “fast and frugal heuristics” to make choices
(Kahneman 2012, 20; Gigerenzer 2001; Cairney and Kwiatkowski 2017). In a process of
mutual trust development, actors:
A. Draw on their own cognition, to calculate the risk of action, and emotion, to
inform hope in others or the fear of inaction, to produce a disposition to
trust; and
B. Demonstrate trustworthiness by developing a reputation for integrity, credibility,
and/or competence.
Key factors include: shared characteristics (such as beliefs, norms, or expectations);
reputations (for being reliable, predictable, honest); behavior (repeated interaction, face
to face contact); and, authority (such as the power to achieve a stated outcome). In
each case, we should not assume that trust development is necessarily “good” (Devine
et al. 2020). For example, people are susceptible to well-told stories with a hero and
moral, and prone to trust a narrator’s story if it reinforces the story they tell themselves
or if people feel like they know the narrator (Jones, McBeth, and Shanahan 2014;
Tuckett and Nikolic 2017). Cognitive biases help explain why people invest dispropor-
tionate amounts of trust in certain organizations or institutions, which may contribute
to “groupthink” when trust in the advice of a small group undermines learning from
people outside that group. Or, their beliefs may prompt too-high trust in government,
rather than a healthy level of distrust that “underpins the democratic accountability
needed to motivate good governance” (Devine et al. 2020, 2). Further, individual
psychology may contribute to an often-damaging combination of trust in some social
groups or coalitions but distrust in others (Sabatier et al, 1987). For example, policy-
makers make quick emotional and moral judgements about social groups which may
reinforce an inconsistent tendency to trust some but not others (Schneider, Ingram,
and DeLeon 2014).
2.2. Social and political rules
Repeated exchange is often key to developing trust based on a perception of compe-
tence, reliability, and perhaps selflessness, driven by evidence of behavior (Barber 1983;
Zucker 1986). However, people also have to trust people they do not know, which may
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prompt them to rely on shared expectations, interests, values, or beliefs. In either case,
formal and well-understood rules help produce predictable behavior (such as by assign-
ing authority), while informal rules and norms reflect the ways in which people signal
to each other their credibility and reliability during repeated interactions. Institutions
can reflect high levels of trust, when effective practices—built on reciprocity, emotional
bonds, and/or positive expectations—become norms or are formalized. Or, they repre-
sent a need to deter the breach of trust, by introducing expectations combined with
sanctions for not behaving as expected (Rousseau et al. 1998; Barber 1983; McAllister
1995; Gulati 1995; Zucker 1986). In that context, trust is a resource to help reduce
uncertainty, reduce the transactions costs of monitoring behavior or enforcing con-
tracts, and boost cooperation and coalition formation.
For example, the Institutional Analysis and Development framework describes peo-
ple as social beings who share information, become known as reliable and predictable,
and come together to produce, monitor and enforce rules for the benefit of the group
and wider society (Ostrom 1990, 208). These actors have often learned about rule effi-
cacy—to encourage cooperation and punish opportunism—through trial-and-error
over a long period, beginning with simple, low-cost operational rules producing quick
wins (Ostrom 1990, 14; 34; 140–142). Trust develops when participants communicate
regularly, share an understanding of their common interests, reciprocate each other’s
cooperation, and have proven to be reliable (Ostrom 1990, 183). Similarly, the
Advocacy Coalition Framework identifies trust development for collective action: coali-
tions use their shared beliefs and/or follow people with scientific or political authority
to foster initial low-stakes cooperation; and, the increased frequency of fruitful inter-
action helps reduce transactions costs when sharing information and seeking agree-
ments (Ingold, Fischer, and Cairney 2017, 448; Weible, Pattison, and Sabatier 2010).
2.3. A functional requirement of social relations
People recognize their interdependence and their need to cooperate without knowing
what will happen. A focus on societal interdependence resembles the study of complex
systems which cannot be simply reduced into individual action: “Being a collective
attribute, trust is applicable to the relations among people rather than to their psycho-
logical states taken individually” (Lewis and Weigert 1985).
For example, the Ecology of Games framework (EoG) assumes that people act on
their “social tribal instincts” and emotions, emphasizing: “instinctual ‘fast thinking’,
cooperation, in-group biases, and social learning”, producing “some individuals who
are altruistic, others who conditionally cooperate, and a minority who pursue their
self-interest regardless of the welfare of others” (Lubell 2013, 544–545). Actors form
alliances based on strongly held beliefs, process new information to refine their beliefs
and strategies, but “never have complete knowledge” of the environment in which they
operate (2013, 544). This action takes place in a “self-organising system” in which pol-
icymaking “fragmentation” has the potential to undermine cooperation (2013, 546).
EoG analyses how many policymakers can cooperate in complex systems over which
no single government has control, necessitating cooperation within and across many
policymaking venues (2013, 547; see also Swann and Kim 2018, 281–286).
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EoG also draws on the study of “collaborative governance” practices to develop
social capital. This process is about trust-building via a “virtuous cycle of collabo-
ration”, in which there are (a) “starting conditions”, such as distributions of power
(many power imbalances help create distrust) and initial levels of trust based on incen-
tives and previous experiences of conflict or cooperation, (b) facilitating factors, such
as appropriate institutional design and leadership, and (c) self-reinforcing processes of
“trust building”, relating to commitment, shared goals and values, dialogue, and
“intermediate outcomes” – such as “small wins” - that facilitate positive engagement
(Ansell and Gash 2007, 550).
3. The role of trust in COVID-19 policy: experts, governments,
and citizens
This focus on individual, institutional, and systemic factors helps describe trust devel-
opment as a process and highlights a crucial distinction between something we need
but may not possess. We focus on three aspects of COVID-19 policy that highlight the
potential gulf between trust as a functional requirement of political systems and dis-
trust as an obstacle to political action. To what extent do:
1. Policymakers trust scientific evidence and expert advice?
2. Policymakers trust citizens to change their own behavior for the public good?
3. Citizens trust their governments to address COVID-19 competently?
In each case, trust development processes can enable evidence-informed policy
design and compliance with government policy. Or, distrust can prompt some policy-
makers or citizens to ignore expert advice and government exhortation. Table 2 sum-
marizes the dynamics of trust as applied to these three categories.
It gives a flavor of the individual, institutional, and societal dynamics at play in trust
development, to guide our comparison of policy design in the UK and US.
4. Policymaker trust in science advice: high in the UK, mixed in the US
Trust in scientific evidence and expert advice is essential to policy design, and may be
fostered by government rules and policymaker faith in key sources. Senior UK and
Table 2. Three dynamics of trust in evidence and experts, citizens, and governments.
Trust in: Individuals Institutions Societal necessity
Evidence and
advice
Policymaker trust in experts
based on beliefs and
previous exchanges
Scientific rules to gather
evidence and government
rules on the use of advice
Evidence as necessary for
policy (reduce uncertainty
and ambiguity)
Citizens Policymaker trust in citizens
based on beliefs and mass
social behavior
Collaborative rules and social





necessary for public health
(reduce unpredictability)
Governments Citizen trust in governments
based on beliefs and
track records
Political system rules to foster
trust in policymakers and
deter breaches
Trust in leaders as necessary
for coherent action
(reduce division)
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devolved government ministers made a strong public commitment to trusting science
and science advice to inform COVID-19 policy (during an initial response in which
UK and devolved policy was well coordinated). For example, UK Prime Minister Boris
Johnson (2020a) described policy “guided by the science,” while Health Secretary Matt
Hancock (2020) described UK government policy design “driven by the science and
guided by the expert recommendations of the 4 UK Chief Medical Officers and the
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies” (SAGE). UK ministerial press conferences
were characterized by briefings from ministers and science or medical officials. Guided
by “the science” means “our scientists”, most notably the UK government’s Chief
Scientific Adviser and chair of SAGE (Sir Patrick Vallance) and Chief Medical Officer
(Professor Chris Whitty). This language is rhetorical (Stevens 2020), but science advice
influenced how UK ministers sought to reduce COVID-related ambiguity and
uncertainty.
UK government policy was consistent with SAGE evidence and advice in two crucial
ways (Cairney 2020a). First, it underpinned the UK government’s definition of the pol-
icy problem: coronavirus represents a long term problem with no immediate solution
(such as a vaccine) and minimal prospect of elimination; so, use policy measures on
social distancing to flatten the first peak of infection and avoid overwhelming health
service capacity; don’t impose or relax measures too quickly (which will cause a second
peak of infection); and, reflect on the balance between (a) the positive impact of lock-
down on the incidence and rate of transmission, versus (b) the negative impact of lock-
down on freedom, physical and mental health, and the immediate economic
consequences.
Second, the timing of UK government intervention tied strongly to SAGE advice on
the urgency of the problem. In January, SAGE discussed uncertainty about human-to-
human transmission and it associated coronavirus with Wuhan in China. In February,
it had more data on transmission but described high uncertainty on what measures
might reduce the impact of the epidemic. In March, it focused on preparing for the
peak of infection on the assumption that it had time to transition gradually toward
social distancing measures. This approach began to change from mid-March when the
number of people infected, and the rate of transmission, was larger and faster than
SAGE expected. The Prime Minister’s subsequent declarations of national emergency
(16.3.20) and lockdown (23.3.20) did not lag behind SAGE advice.
In other words, there is evidence of mutual trust between UK ministers and their
science advisors (albeit within an unequal relationship in which ministers are in
charge): the latter tailored their advice to UK minister beliefs on what action was feas-
ible in a liberal democracy, and the former built the timing and substance of policy on
SAGE advice. Indeed, some emerging criticism in the UK is that ministers trusted par-
ticular advisors too much, at the expense of seeking evidence from a wider pool of
experts, such as the “Independent SAGE” (2020) group which formed to challenge UK
policy. The latter symbolizes distrust in outsiders, particularly when there are conflict-
ing beliefs on policy, no regular interaction, and disagreement between internal and
external scientists (such as during the shift toward mask use in public—
Greenhalgh 2020).
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In the US, historically high levels of political polarization presented two different
approaches to scientific advice. At the executive level, President Trump rejected the
value of science and science advice, while his Democratic opponents in Congress did
the opposite. Neither action changed public views (Evans and Hargittai 2020), but they
contributed to differences between federal and state action in a way not witnessed in
the UK.
President Trump questioned the trustworthiness of public health experts’ warnings,
in particular by Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases. These seeds of distrust were reinforced by influential conservative
media personalities and Presidential allies such as Sean Hannity, Laura Ingram, and
Rush Limbaugh. This messaging undermined the early federal agency policy responses,
in particular the White House Coronavirus Task Force, chaired by Vice President Mike
Pence, and including the heads of key agencies such as Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, Food Drugs, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security,
Housing and Urban Development, Surgeon General, and Treasury (Gadarian et al.
2020). Further, its combined health and economic role ensured that the scientific evi-
dence was often at odds with plans to reopen the economy. By early March, many
Senate Republicans pressured President Trump in vain to make Fauci the face of the
Task Force. Trump also undermined the effectiveness of key federal agencies by
appointing people who countered medical and scientific evidence. Agency autonomy
and control is further complicated by the “joint custody” arrangement involving the
president, Congress and courts (Yesilkagit and van Thiel 2008; Carpenter 2001) which
made it difficult for them to maintain their own political legitimacy during the pan-
demic. For example, in a whistleblower complaint, Rick Bright, Director of the
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority claimed that he was
removed from his position because of his reluctance to promote the use of chloroquine
and hydroxychloroquine which had not been tested and deemed safe for treating
COVID-19 by the Food and Drug Administration.
This experience contrasts with the high level of trust of scientific advice expressed
by Democrats, during the Obama administration’s support for agencies which champ-
ioned the “Playbook for Early Response to High-Consequence Emerging Infectious
Disease Threats and Biological Incidents,” and expressed in Congressional Democrat
criticism of the Trump administration’s tendency to ignore warnings by the scientific
community. Further, state level policymakers placed high trust in chief medical officers,
considered to be trustworthy allies particularly in hard-hit northwestern and midwest-
ern states. Their advice triggered early and extensive executive orders closing many
public buildings, schools, and non-essential businesses despite a considerable cost to
state economies
5. Policymaker trust in citizens: initially high in the UK, mixed in the US
Trust in citizens can underpin voluntary over coercive public health measures, fostered
by societal norms and policymaker trust in the reliability of social behavior. In that
context, we can identify a spectrum of relevant government responses, from the “strict
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quarantining” in China to Sweden’s relative lack of lockdown based on “a culture of
trust and responsibility” (Weible et al. 2020, 227).
The UK resembled Sweden until mid-March. UK government ministers and their
science advisors treated action in China and South Korea as not feasible in a liberal
democracy (until the lockdown in Italy shifted attitudes). SAGE (25.2.20 in Cairney
2020a) described motivating people by relating behavioral change to their lives, stress-
ing “personal responsibility and responsibility to others”, emphasizing transparency,
honesty, clarity, and respect, to maintain high trust in government and promote a sense
of community action (“we are all in this together”). UK ministers described their trust
in citizens to modify their own behavior voluntarily for the public good. Most policy
was underpinned by exhortation and advice: to wash hands well, stay a safe distance
from other people, and isolate at home if experiencing COVID-19 symptoms (Cairney
2020b). They placed minimal restrictions on international and domestic travel, allowed
mass and small gatherings, and did not seek to close public services such as schools or
social venues such as bars and theaters.
The Prime Minister’s speech on the 23rd March signalled a major policy shift.
Johnson (2020b) combined a statement—later backed by legislation—on highly
restricted behavior (to stay at home unless performing an essential task, such as food
shopping or going to work) and a signal of police enforcement (to close non-essential
businesses and regulate public behavior) to replace trust-based exhortation. Still, during
this lockdown, ministers focused on exhortation to act in the public good, backed by
unprecedented tax-breaks and loans for affected businesses and a scheme to pay 80%
of the wages of temporarily furloughed staff, while police forces emphasized policing
by consent rather than obligation. UK government ministers maintained this emphasis
during the relaxation measures, emphasizing personal responsibility to “stay alert” and
encouraging individuals and businesses to conduct risk assessments for a return to
work (while devolved government ministers often expressed a relative reluctance to
relax measures too soon). UK ministers described trust in citizens—to act in an honest,
responsible, and competent way—based loosely on a reference to high social capital
and the belief that there is high public commitment to support the public good. To
some extent, its actions followed SAGE advice to avoid the “us versus them” grievances
associated with excessive state action (Cairney 2020b).
In the US, approaches varied more across levels of government. Despite authorizing
FEMA to declare a COVID-19 Emergency Declaration on March 13, the President did
not support major policy change and federal agencies did not employ emergency
powers to restrict citizen behavior (with the exception of the international travel bans).
Consequently, greater restrictions were introduced at the state level. The initial out-
breaks occurred primarily in the northeast (Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York)
and then Michigan and Illinois. The restrictions in these states were somewhat greater
than in the UK before its lockdown. The most impacted states announced similar states
of emergencies accompanied by executive orders (beginning with New York on March
3rd) during a process of rapid regional policy emulation (see Berry and Berry 2018). In
each state, the pattern was similar: banning nonessential gatherings, making all non-
essential workers stay at home, and issuing stay home orders. New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo’s quip that the orders are “not helpful hints” projects a temporarily-
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suspended trust of citizens. Eventually, nearly all of states declared a patchwork of
restrictions and states of emergency of some kind, partly to reflect a widespread non-
compliance with the CDC-issued recommendations that relied unsuccessfully on vol-
untarism (Haffajee and Mello 2020). As the pandemic worsened throughout the US,
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York placed quarantine restrictions on residents
from newly and highly infected states.
Outside of the early affected states, there was considerable variation on the restric-
tions placed on its citizens. In the absence of an equivalent to coordinated UK/
devolved government action, public health policies functioned only because a large
proportion of citizens had “massively, and voluntarily, chosen to cooperate” leading to
many spontaneous, bottom-up initiatives such as homeschooling, citizen-organized ini-
tiatives to assist neighbors, or citizens making face masks and respirator valves (Steen
and Brandsen 2020).
6. Citizen trust in government: initially high in the UK versus a legacy of
distrust in the US
Trust in government leaders is necessary for well-supported action, fostered by citizens’
trust in policymakers based on their beliefs, the track records of policymakers, and
rules to deter breaches of trust. The UK government approach relied heavily on this
idea, to try to maximize trust in their policies to: (a) minimize the role of imposition to
achieve collective action and (b) maximize compliance, encouraging citizens to regulate
their own behavior on the assumption that high compliance supports an effective pol-
icy by a competent government. Ministers and some advisors also highlighted the
vague concept of “behavioral fatigue”, in which citizens adhere to lockdown measures
temporarily (Oliver 2020) and their relaxation is essential to retain trust in government
(Layard 2020).
However, the relationship between public compliance with government policy and
trust in government is not that clear, and it varies according to factors such as personal
and family exposure to COVID-19 (Devine et al. 2020). The nascent evidence suggests
that high initial compliance with the lockdown related primarily to the perceived threat
of COVID-19 (Devine et al. 2020), “social norms” (Jackson et al. 2020), sympathy with
a Prime Minister in hospital with COVID-19, and national solidarity symbolized by a
universal lockdown (Devine et al. 2020: 6). Focus group respondents described a gen-
eral faith in government during initial uncertainty (akin to trusting a doctor) and
empathy with ministers facing a difficult task (Gaskell et al. 2020). However, national
solidarity and unconditional support is not sustainable during a gradual release of lock-
down, in which visible unequal impacts generate a sense of muddle and favoritism
(Skleparis 2020; Gill 2020).
Further, a perception of government incompetence grew in response to policy mis-
takes relating to: the too-late decision to lock down in March; the lack of safety in
transferring older patients from hospitals to care homes (contributing to high numbers
of deaths); the lack of preparedness for testing (such as to identify transmission, and
support contact tracing) and personal protective equipment (PPE) capacity; and, prob-
lems with new rules in relation to re-opened businesses and schools (Cairney 2020b).
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In addition, the Prime Minister’s support for his most senior special advisor—Dominic
Cummings, who was found to have breached government rules during lockdown—
undermined SAGE advice on maintaining trust in policy and policymakers (Boseley
2020), and contributed to a story of government betrayal (Gaskell et al. 2020).
The overall result is a reduction in trust in government during the release of lock-
down, exacerbated by the Cummings affair. On the 26 May, Savanta ComRes (2020)
described the “government”s approval rating … at 2%, dropping 16 points in just
one day, while the Prime Minister’s own approval is now also below zero (1%), hav-
ing dropped 20 points since the end of last week’. The Policy Institute (2020) suggests
that “the public were losing faith in the UK government’s response to coronavirus”
even before Cummings (while Newton 2020 describes higher faith in media sources
such as the BBC). For some, Cummings’ behavior provides a useful way to defend their
own rule-breaking; for others, it strengthens the resolve to follow rules for the public
good (Jackson et al. 2020).
In contrast to the gradual eroding of trust in the UK, more US citizens exhibited
greater and more intense distrust of restrictive government actions. Distrust of govern-
ment (and trust in other sources such as religious institutions) combines with self-
interest to fuel noncompliance (Kettl 2017; Baum, Jacobson, and Goold 2009; Rakich
2020), ranging from continued social gatherings (most notably at church), the refusal
to wear masks, and extreme cases such as the armed protesters occupying the
Michigan State Capitol (Deslatte 2020). This difference relates partly to a history of
anti-rationalism and anti-elitism that has fueled US citizen distrust of government lead-
ers and institutions (Rigney 1991), and now exacerbated by social media. Citizen dis-
trust is also fueled by the deep polarization of American society: along party lines, with
a larger percentage of those identifying themselves as conservative or Republican being
distrustful of scientific expert recommendations (Hamilton and Safford 2020); and in
relation to race and racism, with African American respondents the least likely to trust
(and therefore welcome cooperation with) the president or the police (Kulke 2020).
Still, most US citizens followed state-level guidelines and executive orders, particularly
during the early stages of the pandemic.
7. Conclusion
Our three guiding questions, based on social science studies of trust, allow us to iden-
tify its important but variable role in relation to COVID-19 policy in the UK and US.
First, to what extent do policymakers trust scientific evidence and expert advice?
The comparison highlights the pitfalls of under- and over-reliance on science advice.
In the UK, ministers invested high trust in their closest science advisors. However, the
development of trust via regular interaction between a small group of people in an
insulated environment produced unintended consequences in relation to distrust of
expert outsiders, which undermined useful challenges to key mistakes. In the US, the
too-low reliance on science advice at a federal level helps explain a fragmented
approach to policy and a tendency for states to take charge of evidence-
informed measures.
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Second, to what extent do policymakers trust citizens to change their own behavior?
Although both political systems foster multi-level policymaking, the UK is more cen-
tralized and able to produce a coherent response. It based policy initially on trust in
citizens to change behavior followed by a pivot to more imposition. Relatively speak-
ing, high coordination allowed UK ministers (and their devolved government counter-
parts) to present an initially consistent message about temporary imposition, in the
wider context of a liberal democracy sold by UK government ministers as high trust
and high freedom. In the US, there was high variation across states and no coherent
message on the temporary suspension of a trust in individuals to act in the public
good. Further, the distrust-fueled polarized debate provides two lenses through which
to view these developments: state action is the antidote to federal inaction or it under-
mines Presidential leadership based on trust in citizens.
Third, to what extent do citizens trust their governments? Public trust in the UK
government and COVID-19 policy was high during an initial lockdown period, fol-
lowed by a rapid drop in trust during a relaxation period characterized by muddle and
unequal impact. Trust varied strongly in relation to beliefs and support for the party of
government, producing slight anomalies in which many people use their reduced trust
in government as a motivator to adhere to social distancing and mask-using. In the US,
this dynamic is complicated by a history of relative distrust in centralized power, pro-
ducing an anomaly in which support for the US President helps predict distrust in
lockdown measures imposed by governments. In other words, trust or distrust in gov-
ernment is a useful but not straightforward predictor of citizen behavior.
Overall, the importance of trust and distrust is universal and an essential part of any
story of COVID-19 policy design and outcomes, but only if studies identify the dynam-
ics of trust processes and go beyond too-general studies of citizen trust in government.
The meaning and practical effect of trust varies markedly by category (individual, insti-
tutional, societal) and political system context, and a wider process of lesson-drawing is
only possible if we take both into account.
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